Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating A Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty by Horowitz, John A.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 65 Issue 6 Article 7 
1997 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating A 
Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty 
John A. Horowitz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John A. Horowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating A Committee to Decide 
Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 2571 (1997). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: CREATING A COMMITTEE TO DECIDE
WHETHER TO SEEK THE DEATH
PENALTY
John A. Horowitz
On March 21, 1995, New York Governor George Pataki super-
seded' Bronx County District Attorney Robert Johnson in the first
degree murder' case against defendant Angel Diaz.3 Governor Pataki
claimed that District Attorney Johnson, by refusing to state whether
he would ever seek the death penalty, failed to implement the laws of
New York.4 Governor Pataki replaced Johnson with Attorney Gen-
eral Dennis Vacco, who subsequently elected to seek the death pen-
alty.5 Johnson, in response to Pataki's supersedure, filed suit seeking
1. The power of a New York Governor to supersede a district attorney is granted
by statute. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(2) (McKinney 1993). This law states that the
attorney general shall:
Whenever required by the governor, attend in person, or by one of his depu-
ties .... for the purpose of managing and conducting ... criminal actions or
proceedings as shall be specified in such requirement; in which case the at-
torney-general or his deputy so attending shall exercise all the powers and
perform all the duties ... which the district attorney would otherwise be
authorized or required to exercise or perform; and... the district attorney
shall only exercise such powers and perform such duties as are required of
him by the attorney-general or the deputy attorney-general so attending.
Id.
2. In New York, a first degree murder conviction requires that the defendant be
older than eighteen years of age and that: (1) the intended victim was a police officer;
or (2) the intended victim was a peace officer;, or (3) the intended victim was an em-
ployee of a state correctional institution; or (4) he was confined in a state correctional
institution; or (5) the intended victim was a witness to a crime and killed to prevent
his testimony; or (6) the defendant committed the killing pursuant to an agreement;
or (7) the defendant killed the victim while committing an enumerated felony; or (8)
the defendant, with intent to cause serious physical injury or death, caused the death
of another person not part of the criminal transaction; or (9) the defendant has a prior
conviction of murder;, or (10) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton
manner inflicting torture upon the victim; or (11) the defendant intentionally caused
the death of two or more persons within a twenty-four month period; or (12) the
intended victim was a judge. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997).
3. Exec. Order No. 27 (1996) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
4. Id. Governor Pataki wrote:
Whereas, a District Attorney who has instituted a blanket policy not to seek
the death penalty violates his obligation to make informed, reasoned deci-
sions on a case-by-case basis and thereby violates as well his sworn obliga-
tion to uphold the laws of this State. In addition, such a failure to exercise
discretion must command my attention, for it implicates my sworn obliga-
tions to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, support the Constitu-
tion and faithfully discharge my duties as Governor.
Id. at 2.
5. James Dao, Vacco Seeks Death Penalty in Police Officer's Shooting, N.Y.
Tunes, July 10, 1996, at B3.
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to nullify the supersedure. 6 Both the trial and appellate courts have
rejected Johnson's request.7
Governor Pataki was not the first New York Governor to exercise
his supersedure power.8 This supersedure, however, was unique.9 In-
stead of invoking his supersedure power because of something as typi-
cal as a conflict of interest,10 Pataki superseded because he perceived
Johnson abused his discretion by refusing to seek the death penalty."
No other New York Governor had ever superseded a prosecutor due
to a specific charging decision.'"
Governor Pataki's supersedure highlighted two related issues. First,
the governor's unfettered power to remove a popularly elected prose-
cutor creates a constant struggle between the prosecutor and the gov-
ernor over who is the proper official to control the discretionary
decision of whether to seek the death penalty. Regardless of who
prevails in the specific conflict, it raises questions about the legitimacy
of the state's capital punishment regime.
Second, Pataki's supersedure focused attention on the danger of al-
lowing a single individual to make the decision to seek the death pen-
alty. Although the events that occurred in New York may not take
place in every state, nonetheless they reveal the risks of granting pros-
ecutors the tremendous power to decide independently which defend-
ants will face a death sentence. As a result, state legislatures should
remove this important decision from the whims and idiosyncrasies of
any individual, whether it be the governor or a prosecutor.
Part I of this Note focuses on discretion generally and how it be-
came the exclusive province of prosecutors. Part II examines the rela-
tionship between prosecutorial discretion and the death penalty. It
first looks at the Supreme Court's treatment of the issue, and then
describes the dangers that result when prosecutors are given sole dis-
cretionary power to decide who will face the death penalty at trial.
These dangers are illustrated in the context of New York's Pataki-
Johnson dispute. Part II then compares New York's statutory provi-
sions with those of California and Colorado to demonstrate how a
scenario similar to New York's Pataki-Johnson dispute could easily
arise in other states. Part III discusses previous attempts at solving
the problem of prosecutorial discretion in the capital punishment con-
6. See Johnson v. Pataki, No. 1714/96, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 9, 1996) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
7. Id at 69; Johnson v. Pataki, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at 1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar.
20, 1997).
8. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
9. See Rachel L. Swarns, Governor Removes Bronx Prosecutor from Murder
Case, N.Y. Tmes, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al (writing that Governor Pataki recognized his
use of supersedure was extraordinary).
10. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
11. Johnson, slip op. at 54-55.
12. Id. at 17-18.
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text, and demonstrates that they have failed because the executive and
judicial branches are incapable of independently removing the discre-
tionary decision from a single individual. Finally, part IV proposes
that the discretionary decision whether to seek the death penalty be
removed from the local prosecutor and given to committees. A com-
mittee would be created for each county or area that has a district
attorney. These committees would consist of three members ap-
pointed by the governor, three appointed by the district attorney, and
one chosen by the other six members. This committee system would
successfully prevent a situation similar to that which occurred in New
York, and would avoid vesting this critical discretionary decision in a
single person.
I. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Prosecutorial discretion is a staple of our criminal justice system. 13
This part discusses prosecutorial discretion generally as a framework
to understand the dangers of prosecutors having the sole power to
decide whether to seek the death penalty. It includes a description of
the reasons for entrusting prosecutors with this discretionary power.
Generally, prosecutorial discretion means "the ability to make deci-
sions about guilt and degree of punishment without the limits of rules
or other constraints on freedom of action." 14 Prosecutors possess this
discretion for a number of reasons: first, simply, they traditionally
have had the power; second, they are experts in the criminal justice
system; and third, society accepts that prosecutors have this power be-
cause it can be controlled through the electoral process.
American prosecutors have long possessed unrestrained power in
the criminal process.15 This power peaked early this century when al-
most every state in the country had constitutional provisions naming
prosecutors as the representative of the public in the criminal justice
13. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
14. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L Rev.
1521, 1523-24 (1981). Vorenberg's definition also includes the lack of judicial review
over a prosecutor's discretion. Id. It was omitted in this Note because of the judici-
ary's inability to solve these discretionary problems.
Discretion affords prosecutors the power to independently make the important de-
cisions in every phase of the prosecutorial process. See Kenneth J. Melilli,
Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. L Rev. 669, 671-72.
Because this Note focuses on the decision to seek the death penalty, the discretion at
issue concerns only the decision of what sentence to seek. All other discretionary
decisions in the capital punishment context, such as the aggravating circumstances the
government will seek to prove or whether to allow the defendant to plead guilty in
return for a sentence of life without parole, should remain with prosecutors.
15. See, eg., United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (finding
prosecution generally to be within the exclusive domain of prosecutors); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (same); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454,
457 (1868) (same); Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor. A Search for Identity 3
(1980) [hereinafter Jacoby, American Prosecutor] ("The American prosecutor enjoys
an independence and discretionary privileges unmatched in the world.").
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system.16 After World War I, in response to this broad power and
widespread increases in crime, the federal government and various
state and city governments created commissions to investigate
prosecutorial discretion. 17 The only significant result of these commis-
sions was that a majority of states required that all prosecutors be
licensed attorneys;' 8 prosecutors have continued to have broad dis-
cretionary power. 9 In addition to this tradition, other justifications
for prosecutorial discretion have been offered.
Prosecutorial discretion might be due also to the fact that prosecu-
tors have the greatest amount of administrative and legal expertise
over criminal justice decisions.2" First, prosecutors may face budget-
ary restraints when determining whether to charge a defendant with a
crime.2 This will force prosecutors to only investigate and prosecute
cases of importance. Without a complete understanding of the crimi-
nal process, including the time and resources required to investigate
and prosecute a certain case, scarce public resources may be spent
unwisely. Second, the need to understand increasingly complex23
criminal codes requires prosecutors to be experts in the code. The
discretionary power given to prosecutors guarantees that they will de-
velop a specialized familiarity with the criminal code, thus ensuring a
correct and fair application.
Although society may accept prosecutors as experts in criminal jus-
tice decisions, there nonetheless exists a desire to maintain some mea-
16. See Jacoby, American Prosecutor, supra note 15, at 28-29. For an in-depth
state-specific description regarding these provisions see Earl H. De Long & Newman
F. Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney: Provisions of Law Organizing the Office, 23 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 926 (1933).
17. Jacoby, American Prosecutor, supra note 15, at 30-36; Robert L. Misner, Re-
casting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 717, 730-31 (1996).
18. See Misner, supra note 17, at 731.
19. See Jacoby, American Prosecutor, supra note 15, at 28,
20. See William F. McDonald, The Prosecutor's Domain, in The Prosecutor 15, 35-
36 (William F. McDonald ed., 1979).
21. See Frank W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a
Crime 159-61 (1970) (noting that in cases where prosecutors explain why less then
maximum enforcement was sought, they must show that the distribution of available
resources proves good faith policy of enforcement); Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion: An Overview, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 383, 413 (1976) (recognizing that limited
resources creates need for prosecutorial discretion); Joan E. Jacoby, The Charging
Policies of Prosecutors, in The Prosecutor, supra note 20, at 75, 91-94 [hereinafter
Jacoby, Charging Policies] (stating that funding may affect prosecutor's cause of
action).
22. See William F. Wessel, From Cracker Barrel to Supermarket: Taking the Coun-
try out of Prosecution Management, in The Prosecutor, supra note 20, at 137, 138-39
(recommending that prosecutors in larger jurisdictions establish specific policies to
deal with expanding case loads).
23. See Misner, supra note 17, at 746 ("Most states' legislatures, by creating too
many policy choices, have effectively abdicated public policy-making to the prosecu-
tor .... .
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sure of control and accountability over prosecutorial conduct.2 4 If the
people do not approve of prosecutors' use of their discretionary
power, they can vote them out of office.' Prosecutors, therefore,
must be careful not to abuse their discretion. This threat of not being
reelected ostensibly serves to protect the public from prosecutors' at-
tempts to misuse this discretion, and warrants giving prosecutors this
discretionary power.
Such fear of losing office forces popularly-elected prosecutors to ad-
dress their constituents' concerns and accurately reflect their commu-
nity's values when making discretionary decisions 6  Local
prosecutors must stay in close contact with the people they represent,
and prosecute only those crimes and those criminals which most con-
cern people.27 The electoral process, therefore, ensures that a com-
munity's standards will be reflected in the criminal justice system. Of
course, the focus on reelection might also cause some prosecutors to
treat a particular defendant either harshly or leniently for political
gain.' The public accepts this risk in return for prosecutors' exper-
tise, and to avoid having to make difficult prosecutorial decisions
themselves.2 9
Just as prosecutors are paid to make these discretionary decisions,
the electorate is ill-informed to pass judgment on each individual deci-
sion.30 The public is not aware of the financial, legal, or political is-
sues prosecutors consider before making decisions such as what crime
24. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United
States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54
Ohio St. L.J. 1325, 1338 (1993). In all but five states (Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware,
New Jersey, and Rhode Island), the district attorney is popularly elected. See Jacoby,
Charging Policies, supra note 21, at 95 n.2.
25. See Jacoby, Charging Policies, supra note 21, at 77; Misner, supra note 17, at
763 (asserting that prosecutors use resources efficiently or risk losing reelection).
26. See Jacoby, American Prosecutor, supra note 15, at 47 ("[T]he prosecutor is a
locally elected official and, as such, must reflect the values and norms of the commu-
nity if he is to attain (and retain) office."); Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Repre-
sentation in Voting Rights Act Jurisprudence, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1409, 1423 (1993) ("The
prosecutor has at least a formal obligation to hear the concerns of her constituents,
and her discretion gives her an avenue through which to apply these concerns to her
task."); Pizzi, supra note 24, at 1337-38.
27. See Pizzi, supra note 24, at 1343-44.
28. See Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 1558.
29. Id. at 1559. Vorenberg's solution is to have prosecutors announce rationales
for their decisions. Id- This, however, fails to resolve the struggle between the gover-
nor and the district attorney or the problem of having one person decide whether to
seek the death penalty. In New York, District Attorney Johnson announced why he
refused to seek the death penalty, and was subsequently superseded by Governor
Pataki. It can be argued, therefore, that by announcing his rationales for not seeking
the death penalty, Johnson exacerbated, rather then solved, the discretionary
problems.
30. See Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion
and the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 Buff. L Rev. 737, 777 (1991)
("[T]he public is generally not very sophisticated about the prosecutor's role in the
criminal justice system.").
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to charge.3' Society, therefore, provides prosecutors with wide discre-
tion, but, as noted above, limits this power by voting the prosecutor
out of office if it believes the discretion has been abused.z
II. DISCRETION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Although the dangers of prosecutorial discretion exist throughout
the criminal process, they are most problematic in the context of the
death penalty, where prosecutors are likely to have the greatest influ-
ence on whether a defendant is sentenced to death.3 3 The grave con-
sequences facing the defendant, and the attention the media and
public pay to capital punishment cases, demand that the decision to
seek the death penalty be made correctly.34 This part first examines
the Supreme Court's treatment of prosecutorial discretion in the
death penalty context. It next focuses on the dangers which arise as a
result of this prosecutorial discretion, and looks at the New York dis-
pute between Governor Pataki and District Attorney Johnson in or-
der to highlight what happens when these dangers arise. Finally, this
part describes how states with statutory provisions similar to New
York's may face a situation similar to what occurred between Pataki
and Johnson, thereby making the solution proposed in this Note appli-
cable beyond New York.
A. The Supreme Court Speaks
The Supreme Court has directly addressed the constitutionality of
prosecutorial discretion in the decision whether to seek a capital sen-
tence against a particular defendant. 35 In Gregg v. Georgia,36 the
Supreme Court found Georgia's capital punishment statute constitu-
31. See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Adminis-
trative Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 473, 473-75
(1976).
32. Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in
America: Direct and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Remedies for Victims of
Police Brutality when the Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 Md. L. Rev. 271, 294
(1994) (arguing that this protection is a facade because most of the decision-making
process is kept private).
33. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of
Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 433,
450 (1995) ("The most important decisions that may determine whether the accused is
sentenced to die are those made by the prosecutor.").
34. See Thomas Johnson, When Prosecutors Seek the Death Penalty, 22 Am. J.
Crim. L. 280, 280 (1994) (noting the impact media portrayal of case has on prosecu-
tors' decision to seek the death penalty); E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Pun-
ishment. A Prosecutor's Perspective, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 649, 669 (1996) (noting that
some prosecutors may seek death penalty to gain media attention).
35. For a discussion on the Supreme Court's treatment of the death penalty gener-
ally, see David Hesseltine, Comment, The Evolution of the Capital Punishment Juris-
prudence of the United States Supreme Court and the Impact of Tuilaepa v. California
on that Evolution, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 593 (1995).
36. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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tional.37 More importantly for the purposes of this Note, however,
was the Court's rejection of the defendant's challenge to what he
called the "unfettered authority" afforded prosecutors by the Georgia
death penalty statute.38 In affirming prosecutors' authority to select
the cases in which to pursue the death penalty, the Court held that
"[a]t each of these [discretionary] stages an actor in the criminal jus-
tice system makes a decision which may remove a defendant from
consideration as a candidate for the death penalty.... Nothing in any
of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defend-
ant mercy violates the Constitution. ' 39  Prosecutorial discretion,
therefore, does not render a state's death penalty unconstitutional.40
B. Dangers of Discretion
Despite its constitutionality, the breadth of prosecutorial discretion
has received much criticism.4 ' Even the Supreme Court, which found
prosecutorial discretion in death penalty cases constitutional, never-
theless, recognized the serious policy issues which arise due to the
death penalty.42 Prosecutorial discretion is essentially unrestricted,
37. Id at 195. The defendant had alleged that Georgia's death penalty statute
resulted in arbitrary and capricious sentences due to the sentencer's discretion. Id. at
200. The Court held that by requiring a jury to consider both the circumstances of the
crime and the criminal in deciding whether to seek a sentence of death, the Georgia
legislature successfully eliminated any arbitrariness in sentencing. Id. at 197-98.
38. Id at 199. The duties of a Georgia prosecutor include "prosecut[ing] all indict-
able offenses." Ga. Code Ann. § 15-18-6(4) (1994 & Supp. 1996). Georgia's death
penalty statute does not, however, provide criteria to direct prosecutors in determin-
ing which defendants against whom to seek the death penalty. See Ga. Code Ann.
§ 16-5-1 (1996). Prosecutors, therefore, have unbridled authority to select when to
seek the death penalty against defendants accused of first degree murder.
39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199; see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976)
(confirming Gregg that prosecutorial discretion did not invalidate state death penalty
statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (same).
40. See Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the
argument that a death penalty statute is unconstitutional due to unbridled
prosecutorial discretion "has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court" (cita-
tions omitted)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
41. See, eg., Kenneth C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 188-
91 (1969) [hereinafter Davis, Discretionary Justice] (attacking American prosecutorial
discretion and its basic assumptions); Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 1554 ("The exist-
ence and exercise of prosecutorial discretion are inconsistent with the most funda-
mental principles of our system of justice and our basic notions of fair play and
efficient criminal administration."). But see Pizzi, supra note 24, at 1329 (stating that
"a defense of the American prosecutor has been long overdue").
42. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the death penalty, despite its
constitutionality, should receive special treatment because "death is different." See
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("In capital proceed-
ings generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a
heightened standard of reliability. This especial concern is a natural consequence of
the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties;
that death is different." (citations omitted)) ; Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58
(1977) (plurality opinion) ("From the point of view of the defendant, [death] is differ-
ent in both its severity and its finality."); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
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thus creating a number of dangers.43 Using the New York dispute as a
case study, this section highlights some of these dangers.
1. Prosecutors May Refuse to Apply Particular State Laws
As noted above, the local prosecutor has extensive power to decide
what cases to pursue and what charges to bring.44 One commentator
has noted, "[the] problem of prosecutorial discretion [is] so acute...
[because the] prosecutor has a monopoly over the criminal process. '45
As a result, prosecutors may, through non-prosecution of certain
crimes, ignore laws passed by the legislature.46 This threat has in-
creased as legislatures have broadened the criminal code without pro-
viding prosecutors additional resources.47 With more conduct being
considered criminal and a limited resource pool, prosecutors cannot
enforce every criminal statute.48 As a result, some crimes go unpun-
ished-in effect, the law is ignored.
Although the danger of a prosecutor ignoring a law exists generally
within a system of unfettered prosecutorial discretion, it poses a par-
ticular problem in the death penalty context. If prosecutors refuse to
seek the death penalty, the result may resemble New York's scena-
rio-supersedure and litigation.49
305 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment, however long."). Whether the Supreme Court still adheres
to this mantra has been questioned in light of recent habeas corpus decisions. See
Diane Wells, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: A Need for a Return to
the Principles of Furman, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 427, 449-65 (1989) ("Regard-
less of the Court's earlier assertions that death is a unique penalty, therefore entitling
capital defendants greater procedural protections than noncapital defendants, the
Court has recently indicated a willingness to abandon this concern.").
43. See Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra note 41, at 188; Cox, supra note 21, at
418; Vorenberg, supra note 14 at 1525.
44. See supra note 43.
45. John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 439, 440 (1974).
46. See Miller, supra note 21, at 184 (noting that prosecutors do not enforce cer-
tain laws, such as prohibition, adultery, and fornication); Aubrey M. Cates, Jr., Can
We Ignore Laws?-Discretion Not to Prosecute, 14 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 3-6 (1961) (describ-
ing laws in Alabama which society would not enforce); Greene, supra note 30, at 738
(stating that "prosecutors choose which laws to enforce, how to enforce them, and
whom they should be enforced against."); Sidney I. Lezak & Maureen Leonard, The
Prosecutor's Discretion: Out of the Closet-Not Out of Control, 63 Or. L. Rev. 247,
248 (1984) (labelling Sunday closing and gambling laws as examples).
47. See Langbein, supra note 45, at 451 (noting that financial pressures, due to
"overcriminalization," are so great that "hardly a serious American writer on criminal
law" fails to call for decriminalization of some crimes); Vorenberg, supra note 14, at
1525 (describing how increase of crimes without additional resources forces prosecu-
tors to consider financial issues when deciding whether to charge).
48. See Miller, supra note 21, at 179-85 (citing extradition as an example where the
decision whether to proceed is directly influenced by the amount of resources avail-
able to prosecutors); Langbein, supra note 45, at 451 ("Prosecutorial discretion is
largely a resource question.").
49. See infra part II.C for a full discussion.
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In addition, despite the constitutionality of vesting the discretionary
decision of whether to seek the death penalty in one person, this
power subjects each defendant to the whims of local prosecutors.5"
Prosecutors may introduce other factors into the decision-most
likely their religious, ethical, or philosophical beliefs.5" Hence,
whether defendants will face the death penalty may be more a result
of prosecutors' belief systems than the characteristics of the criminal's
conduct.52 This subjective system for such a serious decision is funda-
mentally unfair to the defendant.
2. Laws May Be Applied Disproportionately Throughout a State
Although placing discretionary power with popularly-elected prose-
cutors ensures that the public can retain some control over this
power,5 3 it also creates the risk that laws will be applied dispropor-
tionately throughout a state.' The laws that constituents find objec-
tionable differ between counties; therefore due to prosecutorial
discretion, most criminal laws are enforced disproportionately. 5 This
lack of uniformity amongst counties occurs because of differences be-
tween counties, such as the number of crimes committed and the
amount of available resources.56 Each county wants its own prosecu-
tor to have the ability to select the crimes he will enforce;"' the resi-
dents thus accept as part of prosecutorial discretion that the different
counties may not uniformly enforce the criminal code.
The situation differs in a death penalty case, however, because of
the political significance attached to this issue.5 8 Counties which sup-
50. Stewart F. Hancock, Jr. et al., Race, Unbridled Discretion, and lite State Consti-
tutional Validity of New York's Death Penalty Statute-Two Questions, 59 Alb. L Rev.
1545, 1563 (1996).
51. 1d; see also John S. Edwards, Professional Responsibilities of the Federal Pros-
ecutor, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 522 (1983) (urging prosecutors not to allow personal
considerations to affect choosing who to charge); McCann, supra note 34, at 668
("The danger arises... that the prosecutor will be guided not by the appropriate legal
considerations of a particular case but rather by extraneous pressures ... ."); Fred C.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 58 (1991) (noting that prosecutors' discretion "creates a
risk that prejudice or self-interest will govern [their] decisions").
52. See supra note 51.
53. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
54. See Jacoby, American Prosecutor, supra note 15, at 275-78 (recognizing that
different environments within a state affect prosecutors decisions).
55. See Pizzi, supra note 24, at 1343-44.
56. See Jacoby, American Prosecutor, supra note 15, at 276 (noting that different
types of crimes are committed in urban, suburban, and rural areas and that prosecu-
tors' actions reflect the norms of these various communities); Pizzi, supra note 24, at
1344 (stating that "it is almost guaranteed that prosecutors who are elected in highly
rural counties will have quite different constituencies and will face very different crim-
inal problems from those prosecutors elected in heavily urban counties").
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
58. This importance was highlighted in the 1994 gubernatorial race where one in
five voters cited the death penalty as the most important issue of the election.
1997] 2579
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
port the death penalty want to know that a person charged with com-
mitting a heinous murder will stand trial facing the possibility of a
death sentence regardless of where the crime is committed. On the
other hand, counties, like the Bronx in New York, that elect a district
attorney partly due to his opposition to the death penalty, do not want
this preference usurped by the desires of the majority of counties in
the state. This struggle between the interests of a local community
and those of the state-at-large creates a fundamental problem in the
administration of the death penalty. In an attempt to solve this prob-
lem, this Note proposes that the decision whether to seek the death
penalty be made by committees in which both local and state-wide
interests are represented. 59
3. The Threat of Supersedure May Force Prosecutors to Make
Decisions Contrary to Democratic Ideal
Prosecutors in the American criminal justice system can, and must,
freely employ their prosecutorial discretion. ° Prosecutorial discretion
in deciding to seek the death penalty, in combination with either the
governor or attorney general having the power to remove the prose-
cutor, however, creates a problematic situation for prosecutors. Pros-
ecutors opposing the death penalty must choose between: (1) telling
their constituents of their opposition to the death penalty and their
reluctance to seek it, only to be superseded in those cases; (2) acting
against their conscience by remaining vague on the subject and then
seeking capital punishment only in particularly heinous cases; or (3)
denying a blanket refusal to seek capital punishment but nonetheless
proceeding under such a policy.6'
Although the system would function under such circumstances, it is
an inefficient way to conduct a capital punishment regime. Allowing a
See Todd S. Purdum, Voters Cry: Enough, Mr. Cuomol, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1994, at
Bl. Additionally, four out of five Pataki voters supported the death penalty. See
Jacques Steinberg, G.O.P. Strength Denies Cuomo a Close Finish; Suburbs Give
Pataki Bounce, N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 13, 1994, § 13, at 1, 6.
59. See infra part IV.A.
60. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 851, 861 (1995)
(stating that a prosecutor requires discretion to effectively perform duties); Melilli,
supra note 14, at 674 (acknowledging consensus that prosecutorial discretion is inevi-
table in our criminal system); Murray R. Garnick, Note, Two Models of Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 467, 470 (1983) (noting that criminal justice system
requires broad prosecutorial discretion).
61. One example is Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morganthau, who while
publicly announcing his opposition to the death penalty has nevertheless said there
might be cases where he would apply the statute. By clearly denying a refusal to ever
seek the death penalty, Morganthau has thus far successfully avoided the scrutiny that
has plagued District Attorney Johnson. See Jan Hoffman, Death Penalty Raises Issue
of Obligation of Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1996, at 33, 35. In the future, public
pressure may force Morganthau to seek the death penalty if faced with a particularly
gruesome case.
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district attorney to announce that he will never seek the death penalty
might not, on its own, present much of a problem-the voters of the
county would know his views and could indicate their support or dis-
approval at the voting booth.62 When combined, however, with a pro-
death penalty governor entrusted with unlimited supersedure power,
the process becomes costly, contentious, and counter-productive.6 A
closer examination of the Pataki-Johnson struggle, which follows be-
low, reveals the depth of the problems engendered by such a system.
C. Pataki v. Johnson: A Dispute in New York
In March 1995, the New York State legislature passed a statute
making first degree murder' punishable by death or life imprison-
ment.65 Under the statute, individual district attorneys have absolute
discretion whether to seek a death sentence;66 this grant of prosecu-
torial power led to a legal firestorm.
On the day the statute passed, Bronx District Attorney Robert T.
Johnson announced: "[W]hile I will exercise my discretion to aggres-
sively pursue life without parole in every appropriate case, it is my
present intention not to utilize the death penalty provisions of the
statute."'67 Johnson's reluctance to seek the death penalty was based
on his concern about the possibility of the innocent being put to death,
62. See supra note 58.
63. One could argue that the decision reached in the Johnson case makes future
executive orders to supersede straightforward. Even so, costs still exist in transferring
the case from the district attorney's office to the attorney general. In addition, the
time lost in moving the case could be significant because the state has only 120 days to
decide whether to seek the death penalty. See infra note 66.
64. See supra note 2.
65. N.Y. Penal Law § 60.06 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997). The statute provides
in part: "When a person is convicted of murder in the first degree . . . ,the court shall
... sentence the defendant to death, to life imprisonment without parole.., or to a
term of imprisonment for a class A-1 felony other than a sentence of life imprison-
ment without parole. . . ." Id.
66. Although the statute makes no mention of what factors to consider in seeking
the death penalty, prosecutors have only 120 days to decide to whether to seek the
death penalty. N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 250.40 (McKinney Supp. 1997). The statute states
in pertinent part:
2. In any prosecution in which the people seek a sentence of death, the
people shall, within one hundred twenty days of the defendant's arraignment
... serve upon the defendant and file with the court... a written notice of
intention to seek the death penalty.
3. [W]here the people file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty...
the defendant shall be entitled to an additional sixty days for the purpose of
filing new motions or supplementing pending motions.
4. A notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be withdrawn at any
time by a written notice of withdrawal filed with the court and served upon
the defendant. Once withdrawn the notice of intent ... may not be refiled.
Id
67. Press Release, Office of the District Attorney of Bronx County, Statement of
Bronx District Attorney Robert T. Johnson Regarding the Death Penalty in New York
(Mar. 7, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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the uncertainty of a jury actually sentencing a defendant to death, the
probability of unfair application of the death penalty, and the "enor-
mous" price of death penalty cases in both time and resources.68
Johnson announced his views on the death penalty to alert his constit-
uents that his office would not aggressively pursue it.69 Eight months
after publicly refusing to apply the death penalty statute, District At-
torney Johnson was overwhelmingly reelected.70
Soon after this election, in December 1995, Johnson's reluctance to
seek the death penalty became an issue again when Michael Vernon
was arrested and accused of killing five people in a shoe store in
Bronx County.71 New York Governor George Pataki wrote a letter to
Johnson inquiring whether Johnson would seek the death penalty in
the case, and requested a response that day.7' Pataki also inquired
"whether [the decision not to seek the death penalty] was based on a
review of the specific facts in the exercise of your professional discre-
tion or reflects a policy decision not to seek the death penalty in any
case in Bronx County."73 Johnson answered that he would "exercis[e]
[his] statutory discretion to seek a term of incarceration of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole. '74 Governor Pataki reluc-
tantly accepted Johnson's decision based on the fact that the district
attorney had "deliberated with [his] executive staff ... and ... the
decision not to seek the death penalty was based on [his] 'statutory
discretion."' 75 Pataki added, however, that he would "take all appro-
priate action needed to ensure that [the capital] sentencing option is
available to all the residents of the State, including Bronx County. '76
This dispute peaked on March 14, 1996, when a New York City Po-
lice Officer was murdered in Bronx County.77 After three men were
arrested, police quickly identified Angel Diaz as the man who shot the
officer; Diaz thus became eligible to face the death penalty. 78 Gover-
nor Pataki again wrote to Johnson-this time directly asking Johnson
68. Il
69. Jan Hoffman, Prosecutor in Bronx, Under Fire, Softens Stand Against Execu-
tions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1996, at Al, B5.
70. Ian Fisher, Molinari Loses Race for District Attorney on Staten Island, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1995, at Bi, B4.
71. Matthew Purdy,. 5 Are Killed by Gunman in Bronx Shoe Store, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 20, 1995, at Al, B6.
72. Letter from George E. Pataki, Governor of New York, to Robert T. Johnson,
Bronx District Attorney (Dec. 20, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
73. Id
74. Letter from Robert T. Johnson, Bronx District Attorney, to George E. Pataki,
Governor of New York (Dec. 20, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
75. Response from George E. Pataki, Governor of New York, to Robert T. John-
son, Bronx District Attorney (Dec. 20, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
76. Id.
77. See Clifford Krauss, Officer Killed and Another Hurt in Carjacking Battle in the
Bronx, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1996, at Al.
78. See Clifford Krauss, 3 Men Held in Killing of Officer, Bringing Calls for Death
Penalty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1996, at 1, 24. Under the New York first degree murder
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to elaborate the circumstances under which he would seek the death
penalty.79 He did not, however, inquire whether Johnson would seek
the death penalty in this particular case. At the same time, Pataki
reiterated that, as governor, he had the power to supersede the district
attorney.80 Johnson responded by calling Pataki's request a form of
"don't ask, don't tell. ' 81 Johnson claimed Pataki's deadlines and ulti-
matums represented punishment for Johnson's announcement of his
views on the death penalty prior to an election.8s He called Pataki's
threat of supersedure "tantamount to the disenfranchisement of the
voters of the Bronx.18 3
Before Johnson was statutorily required to decide whether to seek
the death penalty against Angel Diaz, Pataki issued an executive or-
der superseding Johnson with Attorney General Dennis Vacco.84 This
order effectively removed Johnson as the prosecutor and entrusted
Vacco with the responsibility for deciding whether to seek the death
penalty against Diaz. Almost four months later, but within the statu-
torily mandated 120 days, 5 Vacco declared his intention to seek the
death penalty.'
New York's history reflects significant use of the supersedure power
and provides precedent for Governor Pataki's supersedure of District
Attorney Johnson in the Diaz case. New York law codifies the gover-
nor's power to supersede a local district attorneys7 and the practice
has been widely accepted. 88 In New York, an executive branch mem-
statute, a defendant is eligible for the death penalty if "the intended victim was a
police officer." N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
79. Letter from George E. Pataki, Governor of New York, to Robert T. Johnson,
Bronx District Attorney (Mar. 19, 1996) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). The
tone of this letter was much harsher then previous letters. Pataki wrote, "As Gover-
nor, I cannot permit any District Attorney's personal opposition to a law to stand in
the way of its enforcement. No one, including a District Attorney, can substitute his
or her sense of right and wrong for that of the Legislature." Id.
80. See id.
81. Letter from Robert T. Johnson, Bronx District Attorney, to George E. Pataki,
Governor of New York (Mar. 20, 1996) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Exec. Order No. 27 (1996). The history of supersedure in New York is well-
examined in Robert M. Pitler, Superseding the District Attorneys in New York City-
The Constitutionality and Legality of Executive Order No. 55, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 517
(1973). Pitler concludes that "[t]he constitutional history of New York State demon-
strates that a district attorney, despite his local election in the county in which he
serves, is a state executive officer performing a state function and is therefore subject
to the exercise of the governor's executive power." Id. at 545. This paper does not
argue that the supersedure of District Attorney Johnson was unconstitutional, but
rather that it fails to solve the discretionary problem; it simply effects an intra-execu-
tive branch transfer of this discretion.
85. See supra note 66.
86. Dao, supra note 5, at B3.
87. See supra note 1.
88. See Johnson v. Pataki, No. 1714/96, slip op. at 66-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 9,
1996) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (holding that New York Governor has
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ber's ability to supersede the district attorney dates back to the crea-
tion of the district attorney's office.89 At that time, either the
governor or trial court judge, through a written order, could direct the
attorney general to conduct a prosecution in any county of the state.90
Though many governors expressed a general reluctance to use the
supersedure power, most nevertheless used it, albeit in varied ways. 91
For example, Governors Flower, Dewey, and Harriman all expressed
a reluctance to supersede a district attorney absent evidence that he
was incapable of performing his duties.92 In fact, between 1910 and
1928, governors superseded district attorneys more than twenty times
and almost every time the order described either the specific persons
involved or the specific crimes committed.93 Other governors were
willing to issue executive orders on a much broader scale.94 Both
Governor Smith in 1928 and Governor Lehman in 1938 issued broad
supersedure orders in cases involving various unnamed corrupt acts by
public officers and persons connected with them.95
The New York courts have upheld a governor's right to supersede a
district attorney.96 In Mulroy v. Carey, a county executive filed suit
to enjoin the governor from superseding the district attorney in an
investigation of public officials accepting bribes.9 The court initially
held that the New York Governor has the power to supersede a dis-
trict attorney.99 The court wrote: "Since the People of the State, by
specific provision in the Constitution (Article IV, § 3) have charged
the Governor with the duty to 'take care that the laws are faithfully
executed,' and the Legislature has expressly implemented that provi-
sion ... it appears prima facie that [the Governor's power to super-
sede] is valid."'0 0 The court also held that the governor did not have
to persuade a court that reasonable grounds existed to supersede the
power to supersede a district attorney in a criminal matter); Pitler, supra note 84, at
522-27 (providing history of use of supersedure in New York).
89. See Pitler, supra note 84, at 519.
90. Id. at 520.
91. Id. at 522-27.
92. Id. at 523, 526. Governor Flower, however, did acknowledge that there may
be cases "where, by reason of personal or local complications, the interests of a thor-
ough and impartial prosecution demand that the Attorney-General should supersede
the district attorney.... But they are rare, and resort to this statute, therefore, ought
to be equally rare." 1894 Public Papers of Governor Flower 67.
93. See Pitler, supra note 84, at 524.
94. Id. at 524-25.
95. Id
96. See B. brecamo v. Bennett, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270, 275 (App. Div. 1940) (holding
that governor's statutory supersedure power was constitutional).
97. 396 N.Y.S.2d 929 (App. Div.), aff'd, 373 N.E.2d 369, 369 (1977).
98. Id- at 930-31.
99. Ia& at 931.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
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district attorney.10 1 In affirming the lower court, the Court of Appeals
refused, however, to decide "whether in any or all circumstances the
exercise of the executive power to supersede an elected district attor-
ney would be beyond judicial review or correction in a direct or collat-
eral action."'102
Against this backdrop, the struggle between Governor Pataki and
District Attorney Johnson moved to the courts. Johnson filed suit in
the Supreme Court of Bronx County seeking a writ of mandamus10 3 to
prevent the governor from implementing the executive order.' °4 The
court was to decide "whether the Governor of the State of New York
can supersede the District Attorney of Bronx County with respect to a
criminal prosecution under the [death penalty] statute."105 Johnson's
primary claim was that Pataki's executive order was unprecedented-
indeed, no governor had ever superseded a district attorney in a crimi-
nal matter over a disagreement about what particular sentence to
seek.' °6 Johnson claimed that the governor misinterpreted the death
penalty statute as giving him absolute and unfettered supersedure au-
thority.10 7 The purpose of supersedure, Johnson argued, is to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed; hence, because the death penalty
statute never requires the district attorney to pursue the death pen-
alty, the law was, in fact, faithfully executed.'0 8 Under this interpreta-
tion of New York's Death Penalty statute, therefore, the governor
never has the power to remove the district attorney.' °9
Governor Pataki, not surprisingly, had a different view. First, he
contended that the separation of powers doctrine '10 dictated that the
governor's ability to remove one executive officer for another was a
101. Id. at 932-34 (stating that governors self-imposed limitations on their superse-
dure power "did not reflect any statutory compulsion nor an abdication by the gover-
nors to the courts, thereby permitting the courts to impose a burden of proof.. . that
they have adhered to an appropriate executive standard" (citations omitted)).
102. Mulroy v. Carey, 373 N.E.2d 369, 369 (N.Y. 1977).
103. Mandamus is:
a writ... which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is directed to
... an executive, administrative or judicial officer, or to an inferior court,
commanding the performance of a particular act... or directing the restora-
tion of the complainant to rights or privileges of which he has been illegally
deprived.
Black's Law Dictionary 961 (6th ed. 1990). For a history of mandamus see Kathryn
A. Brown & Michael H. Shaut, Note, The Use of Mandamus to Control Prosecutorial
Discretion, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 563 (1976).
104. Johnson v. Pataki, No. 1714196, slip op. at 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 9, 1996) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review).
105. Id- at 1.
106. Id- at 17.
107. Id- at 18.
108. Id. at 19-20.
109. Id- at 20.
110. For a thorough discussion regarding the separation of powers doctrine, see
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence,
30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301 (1989).
2585
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
plenary power and beyond judicial review.111 He argued that superse-
dure is a political act, and as such, the court's role was limited to de-
termining whether the governor's act is rooted in an express grant of
constitutional or statutory authority. 112 Next, Pataki defended gener-
ally his use of the executive order; if the legislature had intended to
limit a governor's use of his supersedure power, he maintained, it
would have expressly written as much into the statute.' 3 Pataki
claimed that the legislature granted this plain and unambiguous power
to the governor and, therefore, the court should interpret it according
to its plain meaning.114 Finally, Pataki insisted that the facts of this
particular case warranted his executive order." 5 Pataki argued that,
as Governor of New York, his responsibility is to ensure "that the laws
are faithfully executed." 1 6 Since the death penalty statute requires
prosecutors to exercise their discretion on a case-by-case basis, Pataki
claimed that Johnson's refusal to assure the governor that he would
abide by the law forced him to supersede Johnson to ensure that the
law was followed." 7
The court agreed with Governor Pataki that its role was limited to
determining whether the legislature and constitution have granted the
governor the power to supersede.1 8 Relying primarily on New York
state case law, the court held: "In the performance of judicial review,
it is not for the court to decide on the wisdom or necessity of the
Governor's supersedure of the Bronx District Attorney. Nor will the
court pass judgment on the appropriateness of the Governor's motives
in superseding the Bronx District Attorney."" 9 The court noted that
the governor simply designated the attorney general to prosecute the
case against Angel Diaz.' 20 The governor did not, according to the
court, direct the outcome of the case because he did not mandate the
attorney general to pursue the death penalty.1 2 ' Because the legisla-
ture granted the governor this power, and he had not abused it, the
court refused to rule on the merits of the supersedure. 22
111. Johnson, slip op. at 31.
112. Id
113. Id- at 32-33.
114. d at 33.
115. I& at 51-52.
116. N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 3.
117. Johnson, slip op. at 53-55.
118. Id. at 65.
119. Id at 67.
120. Id. at 66.
121. Id One must question the likelihood that Attorney General Vacco had any
choice but to seek the death penalty against Angel Diaz. Governor Pataki had ex-
pended significant political capital by superseding Johnson and he certainly would not
have been pleased to see his efforts go for naught.
122. Id at 67. The court did state that, "[w]hile acknowledging that the power to
supersede a district attorney rests solely with the Governor, the court does not accept
the contention that the superseder authority of the Governor allows for unfettered
discretion in the exercise of that power." Id. The New York Court of Appeals has
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Finally, the court rejected the claim that because the death penalty
statute granted the district attorney absolute discretion he could never
fail to execute the law faithfully. 123 Again noting that the issue was
ultimately nonjusticiable and beyond review of the courts, 24 the court
nonetheless stated that even if it could review the governor's actions,
under a rational basis review, "the Governor had genuine doubt that
the death penalty sentencing option would be employed, a policy
which would belie the faithful execution of the Murder One Statute
and trigger the Governor's constitutional obligation."12 Thus,
although ultimately holding that the case was nonjusticiable, the court
seemed to indicate its support for Pataki's actions.
The criminal litigation ended abruptly when Angel Diaz killed him-
self while incarcerated. 2 6 The litigation between Johnson and Pataki,
however, moved to the appellate level which affirmed the trial court's
decision.'27 The appellate court held, similar to the trial court, that
Pataki's exercise of discretion was not subject to judicial review be-
cause he had acted within his broad constitutional powers.' 2s The ap-
pellate court also recognized that although a New York District
Attorney has wide discretionary power, this power is "subservient" to
the governor's responsibility to ensure that the laws of New York are
uniformly applied.' 29 This decision further entrenched the unlimited
power of the Governor of New York to supersede a local district
attorney.
D. Discretionary Dangers Present in Other States
The battle in New York between Governor Pataki and District At-
torney Johnson potentially may be repeated in other states with capi-
tal punishment statutes. States with provisions mirroring New York's
should heed New York's experience, and recognize that a similar situ-
ation could result in their states as well. The simple requirements in-
clude a popularly elected local prosecutor and a provision in the state
constitution or a state statute granting the governor or attorney gen-
eral power to supersede prosecutors. Although the need for change
refused to hold that the Governor's supersedure power is beyond review in every
circumstance. Mulroy v. Carey, 373 N.E.2d 369, 369 (N.Y. 1977) (mem.).
123. Johnson, slip op. at 68.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 68-69.
126. Rachel L. Swarns, Man Held in Police Death Is Found Hanged in Jail, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 6, 1996, at A2.
127. Johnson v. Pataki, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 24, 1997, at 1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 20,
1997).
128. Id. at 27.
129. Id The court noted, however, that "the door has not been closed on the possi-
ble justiciability" of a challenge to the governor's authority. Id. The court was refer-
ring to language in Mulroy v. Carey, discussed earlier in this Note, where the Court of
Appeals refused to state that these types of cases are never justiciable. See supra note
102.
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might not be as immediate as in New York, these states should never-
theless act to avoid these discretionary problems.
1. California
California's death penalty statute is similar to New York's. 130 The
statute states that murder in the first degree is punishable by death.131
Prosecutors decide whether to seek the death penalty against a partic-
ular defendant in conformity with the general power to handle all
prosecutions in their jurisdiction. 32 In People v. Keenan, 33 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld prosecutors' discretion in deciding
whether to seek the death penalty against a particular defendant. 34 It
wrote that "prosecutorial discretion to select those eligible cases in
which the death penalty will actually be sought does not in and of
itself evidence an arbitrary and capricious capital punishment system
or offend principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel and/or
unusual punishment.' 1 35 In California, therefore, prosecutors have
discretionary power to decide whether to seek the death penalty, simi-
lar to district attorneys in New York. 136
The district attorney in California, however, is supervised by the
attorney general. 137 The California legislature subsequently enumer-
ated the attorney general's supersedure power over district attor-
130. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (West 1988).
131. lId Crimes punishable by death include intentional murder for financial gain,
multiple murders, murder of a peace office, and felony-murder for a specified series
of crimes. Id.
132. See Cal. Gov't Code § 26500 (West 1988) ("The public prosecutor shall attend
the courts, and within his or her discretion shall initiate and conduct on behalf of the
people all prosecutions for public offenses.").
133. 758 P.2d 1081 (Cal. 1988) (in bank), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989).
134. 758 P.2d at 1097-98.
135. Id.; see People v. Ray, 914 P.2d 846, 874 (Cal.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 393
(1996); People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 433 (Cal.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 893 (1992).
136. Keenan, 758 P.2d at 1097-98.
137. Cal. Const. art. 5, § 13. The section reads:
Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney General
shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be the duty of the Attorney
General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately en-
forced. The Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every Dis-
trict Attorney.. . in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective
offices .... Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the
State is not being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of
the Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law ... and in such
cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of the District Attor-
ney. When required by the public interest or directed by the Governor, the
Attorney General shall assist any District Attorney in the discharge of the
duties of that office.
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neys. 38 This supersedure power has been affirmed and generally
found unreviewable by the California courts. 13 9
For example, in People v. Superior Court,140 the government sought
a writ of mandamus after the trial court removed the district attorney
from a criminal case due to a conflict of interest.1 4' The trial court,
after disqualifying the district attorney, ordered the attorney general
to appear before the court. 42 The attorney general obtained a stay
and applied to the higher court for a writ requiring the trial court to
vacate its order.' 43 The attorney general's motion was granted by the
appellate court.144 The appellate court found that the trial court could
remove the district attorney only upon a failure of the attorney gen-
eral to act. According to the appellate court, the attorney general did
not fail to act, but rather elected to allow the prosecutor to try the
case despite the appearance of a conflict of interest.1 45 The Supreme
Court of California, however, reversed the appellate court and upheld
the trial court's removal of the district attorney, directing the attorney
general to assume responsibility for the case.146 It stated that by re-
placing the district attorney with the attorney general, the trial judge
only changed the state's representative, he did not infringe on the ex-
ecutive branch's charging discretion. 47 The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia noted, however:
138. The power is enumerated in two places. California Penal Code section 923
states: "Whenever the Attorney General considers the public interest requires, he
may, with or without the concurrence of the district attorney, direct the grand jury to
convene for the investigation and consideration of such matters of a criminal nature
as he desires to submit to it." Cal. Penal Code § 923 (West 1985). In addition, Califor-
nia Government Code section 12550 states:
The Attorney General has direct supervision over the district attorneys of
the several counties of the State .... When he deems it advisable or neces-
sary in the public interest, or when directed to do so by the Governor, he
shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of his duties, and may,
where he deems it necessary, take full charge of any investigation or prose-
cution of violations of law .... In this respect he has all the powers of a
district attorney ....
Cal. Gov't Code § 12550 (West 1992).
139. See People v. Honig, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 595 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[Article V,
section 13 of the state constitution] confers broad discretion upon the Attorney Gen-
eral to determine when to step in and prosecute a criminal case. And that [section]
does not suggest that the Attorney General's discretion is reviewable by the superior
court at the behest of a defendant.").
140. 130 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Ct. App. 1976).
141. Id at 243. The conflict arose because the mother of the deceased was em-
ployed as a "discovery clerk" for the Contra Costa District Attorney. Id. Addition-
ally, the mother and the defendant were involved in a dispute over the custody of a
child, and the mother would gain custody if the defendant was convicted. Id.
142. IdL at 245.
143. See People v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Cal. 1977).
144. See People v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 241, 245 (CL App. 1976).
145. Id- at 244.
146. People v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d at 1166.
147. 1& at 1169.
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The relative dearth of cases [of trial courts removing the district at-
torney] confirms that such conflicts rarely reach the trial courts. In
this state it appears the issue is often resolved by intervention of the
Attorney General acting under his statutory powers, and nothing
we say herein is intended to discourage that practice.1 48
Although the Supreme Court of California upheld the power of the
trial court to remove the district attorney from a case, it nevertheless
indicated its support of the attorney general's power to independently
remove the district attorney. 49
Because the California courts have upheld the legislature's grant of
power to the attorney general to supersede a popularly elected district
attorney, the possibility exists that a scenario similar to the one that
happened in New York may occur.
2. Colorado
Colorado's death penalty statute is also similar to New York's. In
Colorado, first degree murder is a Class 1 felony,150 punishable by a
minimum of life imprisonment and a maximum of death.151 The stat-
ute grants prosecutors the power to decide whether to seek the death
penalty. 152 In People v. Davis,153 a defendant challenged the state's
death penalty statute on the basis that prosecutors' unlimited discre-
tion violated the defendant's due process guarantee and his protection
against cruel and unusual punishment.- 4 The Colorado Supreme
Court rejected the challenge, relying on Supreme Court precedent l5
to uphold the broad prosecutorial discretion granted by the state
legislature.156
Colorado has also afforded the governor wide latitude in supersed-
ing local, popularly-elected prosecutors. 57 The statutory provision
148. Id. at 1173-74 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 1174. It must again be noted that this case involved a conflict of interest.
It remains unclear how a California court would view a supersedure by the California
attorney general similar to Governor Pataki's in New York.
150. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-102 (1986 & Supp. 1996).
151. See id. § 18-1-105(1)(a)(IV) (Supp. 1996).
152. See id. § 20-1-102(3) (Supp. 1996).
153. 794 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1018 (1991).
154. Id. at 172.
155. See supra part II.A.
156. See Davis, 794 P.2d at 172.
157. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-31-101(1)(a) (1988). The statute states that the
attorney general:
shall appear for the state and prosecute and defend all actions and proceed-
ings, civil and criminal, in which the state is a party or is interested when
required to do so by the governor, and he shall prosecute and defend for the
state all causes in the appellate courts in which the state is a party or
interested.
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granting this power is similar to New York's, in that, unlike California,
the attorney general can act only upon an order from the governor. 5
In People ex reL Witcher v. District Court, 5 9 the Colorado Supreme
Court interpreted this statute to grant the attorney general the author-
ity to prosecute cases on behalf of the state when required to do so by
the governor.160 In Witcher, the governor issued an order directing
the attorney general to investigate incidents occurring within the Col-
orado state penitentiary. 161 Representatives of the district attorney
and the attorney general initially cooperated, but when the defendant
fied a motion requesting designation of the prosecuting attorney, the
attorney general contended that the case should be prosecuted by his
office.' 62 The district attorney challenged the attorney general's au-
thority to prosecute the charges on the grounds that such an attempt
conflicted with another state statute providing that "[e]very district
attorney shall appear in behalf of the state and the several counties of
his district."'163 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the district at-
torney's challenge by quoting language from People v. Gibson: 64
[W]hen the Governor ... requires the attorney general to prosecute
a criminal case in which the state is a party, he becomes to all in-
tents and purposes the district attorney, and may in his own name
and official capacity exercise all the powers of such officer, for he is
then, and in that case, the public prosecutor. Being authorized and
empowered to appear and prosecute, he can do each and everything
essential to prosecute ....
Although the court in Witcher upheld the right of the attorney gen-
eral to assume the prosecutorial duties from the district attorney, in
People ex reL Tooley v. District Court,"6 a companion case decided
the same day, the court held that absent a command from the gover-
nor, the attorney general was not authorized to prosecute criminal
cases. 6 7 In Tooley, the district attorney requested the help of the at-
torney general's office in investigating an auto theft ring."a The two
offices worked together to discover information and to obtain indict-
ments. 69 Later, however, the district attorney requested that the trial
court order him to prosecute the case. 170 The Colorado Supreme
Court held that the statute, which granted the attorney general the
158. It
159. 549 P.2d 778 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).
160. Idt at 779-80.
161. Idt at 779.
162. It
163. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-102 (1986).
164. 125 P. 531 (Colo. 1912).
165. Itt at 536.
166. 549 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).
167. Id at 776.
168. Id at 775.
169. It at 776.
170. Id
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power to supersede the district attorney,' 7' confined the attorney gen-
eral's authority to replace the district attorney to commands from the
governor or general assembly.172 Thus, in Colorado, similar to New
York, the governor has the power to supersede the local district
attorney.
In states such as New York, California, and Colorado, district attor-
neys run the risk of supersedure in death penalty cases. The risk of
supersedure and subsequent litigation highlights the dangers of plac-
ing the decision to seek the death penalty in a single individual. The
solutions available to ameliorate these dangers must, therefore, be
clarified.
III. ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS TO THE DISCRETIONARY DILEMMA
Given the dangers of discretion in the capital context, it is necessary
to evaluate the existing solutions to the problem. This part examines
why states, such as New York, California, and Colorado must avoid
depending exclusively on either the executive or judiciary branch for a
solution to this problem. This part first highlights the fact that acts
within the executive branch, like Governor Pataki's supersedure,
merely transfer this discretionary power. Next, it discusses how the
judiciary has consistently refused to entertain cases involving control
of prosecutorial discretion unless the legislature expressly mandates
that they do so. Finally, this part examines the laws of two states,
Louisiana and Pennsylvania, to show that even when state legislatures
have succeeded in passing legislation that avoids a dispute between
the governor and the district attorney, their legislation nonetheless
fails to solve the discretionary dangers inherent in making prosecutors
solely responsible for deciding who will face the death penalty.
A. The Executive Branch-Pataki's Supersedure
Governor Pataki's executive order was intended to ensure enforce-
ment of the prosecutorial discretion written into New York's capital
punishment statute. 73 His attempted solution, however, failed to
solve the danger of having one person decide whether to seek the
death penalty. 74
Governor Pataki's unprecedented supersedure of District Attorney
Johnson did not achieve its intended purpose of curtailing discretion,
but instead merely transferred discretion away from the local prosecu-
tor and into the hands of the attorney general. The same concern,
however, presents itself with respect to both Johnson's refusal ever to
seek the death penalty and Pataki's superseding him: As long as the
171. See supra note 157.
172. Tooley, 549 P.2d at 776-77.
173. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
174. See supra part II.B.
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death penalty decision remains in the hands of a single individual, the
problems of prosecutorial discretion remain. 75 Whether the responsi-
bility lies with local prosecutors, the governor, or the state attorney
general, each official's own personal agenda will influence the
decision.' 76
The attorney general, when ordered by the governor to replace the
district attorney, will face pressure from the governor to pursue the
death penalty. The governor does not want to supersede a district
attorney for refusing to seek the death penalty only to have the attor-
ney general reach the same conclusion. 177 By superseding the district
attorney, the governor has, in effect, taken the discretion into his own
hands without changing the nature or effectiveness of the discretion
itself. The sole difference is that the discretion is used to always,
rather than never, seek the death penalty.
Finally, the attorney general, as an elected state official, will likely
be seen by the citizens of local community as advancing the interests
of the state over their own.178 The people vote for their local prosecu-
tor, at least in part, because of his stance on the death penalty.179
When the prosecutor seeks to respond to these views by prosecuting
few, if any, capital prosecutions, the people find their elected offi-
cial-who carried out their mandate-removed by a state-wide
elected officer. The litigation in New York, therefore, provides a clear
example of what happens when discretion is placed solely in the hands
of one person and why supersedure fails to solve the problem. Super-
sedure, in this context, results in litigation and political chaos-clearly
an unsatisfactory result.
B. Judicial Control of Discretion
Because a governor's supersedure fails to correct the discretionary
problem, allowing the judiciary to supervise the use of supersedure
power represents another possible solution. The judicial branch, how-
ever, has historically been reluctant to supervise the use of
175. Id.
176. See supra part II.B.1.
177. See Dao, supra note 5, at B3 ("In appointing Mr. Vacco, a fellow Republican
and staunch supporter of the death penalty, the Governor made clear that he felt the
death penalty would be appropriate ...
178. See supra part II.B.2.
179. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 61, at A33 (writing that Johnson announced his
opposition to the death penalty shortly after the law went into effect); George James,
From Albany, Money for 9-Millimeter Police Pistols, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1994, at B3
(noting that politician's death penalty stance put him at odds with Governor Mario
Cuomo); Maria Newman, Vacco Savors Victory as a Mandate for the Death Penalty,
N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 10, 1994, at B16 (noting that majority of Vacco supporters stated
that they believed in the death penalty).
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prosecutorial discretion. 8 ' In United States v. Cox,'8' the United
States Attorney refused to indict defendants accused of perjury in
contravention of the decision of a grand jury and an order from the
court. 82 In a plurality opinion, the Fifth Circuit wrote that "courts
are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers
of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal
prosecutions."' 18 3 Courts' reluctance to interfere can generally be at-
tributed to a respect for the separation of powers doctrine.184
Judicial reluctance to encroach upon the executive's power to pros-
ecute exists on the state level.' 85 In Inmates of Attica Correctional
Facility v. Rockefeller,'86 plaintiffs brought a class action suit seeking
to require federal and state officials to investigate and prosecute per-
180. See Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra note 41, at 209; Miller, supra note 21, at
295. The reluctance of the judiciary was expressed in a 1949 federal district court
opinion:
[The prosecutor] must appraise the evidence on which an indictment may be
demanded and the accused defendant tried, if he be indicted, and in that
service must judge of its availability, competency and probative significance.
He must on occasion consider the public impact of criminal proceedings, or,
again, balance the admonitory value of invariable and inflexible punishment
against the greater impulse of the "quality of mercy." . . . Into these and
many others of the problems committed to his informed discretion it would
be sheer impertinence for a court to intrude. And such intrusion is contrary
to the settled judicial tradition.
Howell v. Brown, 85 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Neb. 1949).
181. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
182. IL at 169-70.
183. It at 171. Additionally, if a judge is permitted to review a charging decision, a
host of procedural questions are raised such as when the review would occur and
whether a judge could add or subtract charges while keeping others. This would force
the judge to ensure that prosecutors' charging decisions were fair, while attempting to
remain neutral. See Pizzi, supra note 24, at 1354.
184. See supra note 110. This section is limited to a focus on the hesitancy of the
judiciary to involve itself in limiting prosecutorial discretion; whether it should be-
come more active in this realm will be left unaddressed. See generally Pizzi, supra note
24, at 1351-55 (analyzing practical problems of judiciary attempting to curb
prosecutorial discretion).
185. See, e.g., People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1097-98 (Cal. 1988) (in bank)
("[P]rosecutorial discretion to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty
will actually be sought does not in and of itself evidence an arbitrary and capricious
capital punishment system.. . ."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989); People v. Cole,
665 N.E.2d 1275, 1289 (Ill. 1996) ("[W]e have determined that the [death penalty]
statute is not invalid for the discretion it affords the prosecutor in deciding whether to
request the death penalty in a particular case." (citations omitted)); State v. Garner,
459 S.E.2d 718, 725 (N.C. 1995) ("This Court has consistently recognized that a sys-
tem of capital punishment is not rendered unconstitutional simply because the prose-
cutor is granted broad discretion."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 948 (1996);
Commonwealth v. DeHart, 516 A.2d 656, 670 (Pa. 1986) ("Absent some showing that
prosecutorial discretion is being abused in the selection of cases in which the death
penalty will be sought, there is no basis for [defendant's] assertions."), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
186. 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
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sons for their alleged mistreatment of inmates."s Plaintiffs claimed
that the deputy state attorney appointed by the governor to supersede
the local district attorney could not neutrally investigate claims against
the governor and other state officials.1 88 The federal court rejected
this claim, based on New York law, they found no mandatory respon-
sibility for the district attorney to prosecute.' 9 Instead, the law allows
prosecutors wide discretion not subject to judicial review. 19°
This judicial hesitancy to encroach on prosecutorial discretion ex-
tends to the capital context. In State v. Bloom,191 the Supreme Court
of Florida spoke directly to this issue. The defendant was indicted and
charged with two counts of first degree murder.'9 The defendant
made a motion on each count that the state lacked sufficient evidence
to warrant a sentence of death. 93 The circuit judge granted the mo-
tion in one count and ordered that the state proceed on a non-capital
count.194 The state appealed, and ultimately the Florida Supreme
Court held that the Florida Constitution, which grants the state attor-
ney complete discretion in deciding what crime to charge against a
defendant, forbade the judiciary from interfering with this discre-
tion.195 Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court held that allowing
the trial judge to make a determination on the death penalty's applica-
bility would modify the state's death penalty statute, which mandates
that the decision to sentence a defendant to death be made after a
determination of guilt. 196 To grant the trial judge this decision making
power would create a "trifurcated death sentence procedure."'" The
Florida Supreme Court, therefore, made it clear that it would not en-
croach upon prosecutors' discretion in deciding whether to seek the
death penalty.
In the suit filed in New York by District Attorney Johnson,198 the
court similarly refused to encroach upon the governor's ability to su-
187. 1& at 376. This suit arose in response to an inmate uprising at Attica Correc-
tional Facility ("Attica"). IL The plaintiffs consisted of former and present inmates of
Attica, a mother of a slain inmate and a New York State Assemblyman. Id. The
complaint alleged that the defendants, including the Governor of New York, the
Commissioner of Correctional Services, and state police and correction officers had
been involved in the commission of various crimes against the plaintiffs and the class
they sought to represent Id.
188. Id at 377.
189. Id. at 382 (citations omitted).
190. Id.
191. 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1986).
192. Id. at 3.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id.
195. Id (citing Fla. Const. art. II, § 3).
196. Id. (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(1) (West 1985)).
197. Id.
198. Johnson v. Pataki, No. 1714/96, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 9, 1996) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
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persede a district attorney finding the issue nonjusticiable. 199 It
viewed its role as limited to determining if the governor's act of super-
sedure was based on an express power granted by the New York State
Constitution or statutory authority.2 0 The reluctance of the judiciary,
on both the federal and state level, to control prosecutorial discretion
renders its presence an inadequate solution to the discretionary
problem.
C. Attempted Legislative Solutions
Despite the judiciary's reluctance to restrict prosecutorial discre-
tion, most legislative solutions aimed at curtailing this discretion in-
clude judicial intervention. Although states employing these solutions
have had success in preventing a situation similar to what happened in
New York, their reliance on the judiciary renders them unhelpful as a
model for states like New York, California, and Colorado. Addition-
ally, although these states have avoided a Pataki-Johnson type dis-
pute, they have failed to address the dangers arising from having one
person make the discretionary decision of whether to seek the death
penalty. This section examines attempts by state legislatures to re-
strict the ability of executive officials to usurp prosecutors of their dis-
cretionary power.
1. The First Attempt-Louisiana
The Louisiana legislature has deemed the judiciary the sole arbiter
of conflicts between the attorney general and a district attorney. An
attorney general cannot, under any circumstance, supersede a district
attorney without obtaining the permission of the court.2 0 ' District
attorneys, therefore, have broad power to prosecute cases.202
The Attorney General of Louisiana has sought to use this power
only twice in state history. In 1981, the attorney general sought to
supersede the district attorney, by applying for a writ of mandamus,
on the basis that the district attorney had obstructed the activities of
199. Id. at 66-67.
200. l at 65 (finding grant of power of supersedure to governor was valid grant of
authority).
201. La. Const. art. IV, § 8(3). The section reads:
As necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or interest of the
state, the attorney general shall have authority... (3) for cause, when au-
thorized by the court which would have original jurisdiction and subject tojudicial review, (a) to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any criminal action
or proceeding, or (b) to supersede any attorney representing the state in any
civil or criminal action.
Id.
202. See Charles J. Yeager & Lee Hargrave, The Power of the Attorney General to
Supercede a District Attorney: Substance, Procedure & Ethics, 51 La. L. Rev. 733, 734
(1991).
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the grand jury.2 3 The court held that if the attorney general could
prove the allegations against the district attorney, then:
the district court shall immediately authorize the attorney general to
(1) institute and prosecute, or to intervene in any proceeding, as he
may deem necessary for the assertion or protection of the rights and
interests of the state in the matters under investigation by the addi-
tional grand jury or any other matters arising therefrom; (2) super-
sede the district attorney in any criminal action resulting from the
activities of the additional grand jur, including any prosecutions
against members of the grand jury.2
In the second case, the attorney general sought to supersede the dis-
trict attorney because missing funds from the district attorney's office
were allegedly used to pay informants. 2 5 Although no definite an-
swer was reached because the district attorney's plea bargain mooted
the issue, the case provides another example of the attorney general
successfully superseding the district attorney subject to judicial
approval.2
If a district attorney under Louisiana's death penalty statute 2°7
elected not to seek the death penalty, the attorney general would have
to show cause in order to supersede the district attorney.208 The de-
termination made by the court is "whether or not the Attorney Gen-
eral possesses information sufficient to warrant official inquiry into
the actions of the district attorney. ' '209 Louisiana, therefore, does not
face the same problems as New York, California, and Colorado be-
cause its constitution forbids supersedure without judicial intervention
and without satisfying certain conditions. Additionally, the Louisianajudiciary has shown a willingness to interfere in the relationship be-
tween the attorney general and the district attorney. Although Louisi-
ana's judicial approval requirement prevents a situation similar to
New York's Pataki-Johnson dispute, the dangers of placing the discre-
tionary power to decide whether to seek the death penalty in one per-
son still exist-regardless of the attorney general's ability to supersede
the district attorney.
In the dispute between Governor Pataki and District Attorney
Johnson, the court refused to challenge the governor's ability to super-
203. In re Guste, 454 So. 2d 806, 806-07 (La. 1981).
204. Id at 807.
205. In re Guste, No. 12-88-103 (E. Baton Rouge Parish Ct. 1987), in Yeager &
Hargrave, supra note 202, app. at 751-52.
206. Yeager & Hargrave, supra note 202, at 738.
207. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (West 1986). The statute states that "[w]hoever
commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death or life imprison-
ment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in
accordance with the recommendation of the jury." Id.
208. "Cause," in Louisiana, has been defined as "a showing that the district attor-
ney is not adequately asserting some right or interest of the state." Plaquemines Par-
ish Comm'n Council v. Perez, 379 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (La. 1980).
209. In re Guste, supra note 205, at 752.
1997] 2597
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sede the district attorney.210 Courts in California and Colorado have
mirrored this reluctance.21' These states, especially New York, have a
body of precedent evidencing the judiciary's refusal to interfere with
the governor's supersedure decisions, regardless of whether the super-
seded party is popularly elected. Though the legislature could follow
Louisiana's lead and mandate judicial involvement, they would still
face the discretionary dangers that exist when a single person is re-
sponsible for deciding whether to seek the death penalty.212
2. The Second Attempt-Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's attempted solution relies on the involvement of the
electorate. In 1978, the residents of Pennsylvania passed a constitu-
tional amendment creating the elective office of the attorney gen-
eral. 1 The legislature codified this amendment by passing the
Commonwealth Attorneys Act. 4 Under the statute, the attorney
general must obtain judicial approval to supersede the district attor-
ney unless the district attorney requests the attorney general's inter-
vention.215 There are, however, only two situations in which the
district attorney can make such a request: (1) the district attorney
lacks the resources to conduct an adequate investigation; or (2) the
district attorney envisions the potential for a conflict of interest.216
This provision had two primary effects. First, it transferred the au-
thority to influence criminal prosecutions through supersedure from
the governor to the attorney general.21 7 More importantly, the act
limited the attorney general's power to remove the district attorney to
the situations enumerated in the act or upon judicial approval.218
Prior to the Attorneys Act's adoption, the attorney general had a
common law power to supersede the district attorney in local
prosecutions. 9
210. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
211. See supra parts II.D.1-2.
212. See supra part II.B.
213. See Gecrge Jugovic, Jr., Legislating in the Public Interest: Strict Liability for
Criminal ActiviTv Under the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act, 22 Envtl. L.
1375, 1380 (1992).
214. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §§ 732-101 to -506 (1990).
215. Id. § 732-205(a)(3)-(4).
216. Id. § 732-205(a)(3).
217. See Jugovic, supra note 213, at 1380.
218. Id. at 1381.
219. See Packel v. Mirarchi, 327 A.2d 53, 54-55 (Pa. 1974) ("Pennsylvania... has
approved the supersession of a district attorney on the basis of common law pow-
ers."); Commonwealth v. Fudeman, 152 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa.) ("[T]he Attorney Gen-
eral... may ... supersede or act in conjunction with a district attorney."), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959). At approximately the same time that the Pennsylvania
legislature passed the Attorneys Act, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing
years of precedent, concluded that the attorney general had no common law power to
supersede a district attorney. See Commonwealth v. Schab, 383 A.2d 819, 822 (Pa.
1978).
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Pennsylvania courts have upheld the Attorneys Act. In Common-
wealth v. Khorey, 20 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the pro-
vision of the Attorneys Act restricting the attorney general's ability to
control criminal prosecutions.221 The court held that the statute ex-
pressly limited the attorney general's ability to supersede to cases
where the district attorney requested his involvement because of a
lack of resources or a conflict of interest.' In Khorey, the attorney
general's office received permission from the district attorney to han-
dle the prosecution because it already had charges pending against the
defendant.2 -3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the defend-
ant's conviction because the attorney general failed to claim the pres-
ence of either statutory scenario that would have enabled the district
attorney to request that the attorney general replace him.3'
Pennsylvania's method of controlling prosecutorial discretion, how-
ever, does not work in death penalty cases. Pennsylvania's death pen-
alty statute,' by not expressly assigning the charging decision to any
other part of the executive branch, leaves the discretion up to the dis-
trict attorney. Because of this unbridled prosecutorial discretion,
Pennsylvania could possibly find itself in a predicament mirroring that
of New York. As in Louisiana,226 however, the attorney general's
only recourse would be to appeal to the courts to remove the district
attorney because abuse of discretion is not one of the two enumerated
factors of the Attorneys Act.27 Once again, this would result in litiga-
tion, but at least, unlike New York, the judiciary would be willing to
provide an answer. Pennsylvania's solution does not, however, re-
solve the dangers of placing the discretionary decision whether to seek
the death penalty with one person.
Neither the executive branch, the judicial branch, nor the legislative
branch through legislation similar to Louisiana's and Pennsylvania's
can address successfully the problem of placing the discretionary deci-
sion whether to seek the death penalty with one person. For a solu-
tion to adequately address the problems of prosecutors' having the
discretionary power to decide whether to seek the death penalty,'
220. 555 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1989).
221. Id. at 109.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 103.
224. Id. at 109-10.
225. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 1102(a) (1983 & Supp. 1996). The statute states, in
pertinent part: "A person who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree
shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment .... ." Id. Murder is of
the first degree "when it is committed by an intentional killing." Id. § 2502(a). Inten-
tional killing is "[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other knd
of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing." Id. § 2502(d).
226. See supra part IlI.C.1.
227. See supra note 216.
228. See supra part II.B.
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states must determine a way to address this specific problem. Part IV
proposes such a solution.
IV. A NEW SOLUTION
The attempted solutions addressed above fail to solve all of the dis-
cretionary problems present in the capital context. Governor Pataki's
solution-simply changing which individual wields the discretionary
power-does not solve the discretionary problems, but rather shifts
discretion from one part of the executive branch to another.229 Most
solutions relying on the judicial branch must confront a reluctant judi-
ciary.23° The legislature, if merely mandating judicial resolution of
discretionary disputes between executive branch officials, fails to ad-
dress the fundamental dangers arising out of prosecutors' sole discre-
tion in seeking the death penalty. This part argues, however, that if
state legislatures confine their focus to discretion in death penalty
cases, a solution emerges.
State legislatures should remove primary responsibility for the dis-
cretionary decision whether to seek the death penalty from both local
prosecutors and the governor by creating committees responsible for
making this decision. The dangers resulting from unbridled
prosecutorial discretion231 merit completely removing prosecutors
from this discretionary decision. Although this solution is most appli-
cable for New York and those states with similar supersedure and
death penalty statutes, it would be appropriate in any state. The dan-
ger of placing the discretion to seek the death penalty in one person
exists regardless of a state's statutory scheme.2 32 This proposal, there-
fore, should be enacted in every capital punishment state.233
A. State Legislatures Should Create Committees
State legislatures should amend their death penalty statutes to in-
clude a provision creating committees empowered to decide whether
to seek the death penalty. These committees would resemble tripar-
tite arbitration boards-an equal number of members appointed by
each side with the last member chosen by the other arbitrators. 234
These death penalty committees would consist of seven members:
three appointed by the governor, three appointed by the district attor-
229. See supra part III.A.
230. See supra part III.B.
231. See supra part II.B.
232. See supra parts II.B, III.C.
233. This is without regard to each individual state's constitutional or statutory pro-
visions which may prohibit the use of committees to make a discretionary decision for
prosecutors.
234. See Frank Elkouri & Edna A. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 129 (4th ed.
1985); Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J.
483, 497 (1996).
2600 [Vol. 65
1997] DISCRETION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
ney, and one chosen by those already appointed. The seventh mem-
ber would be selected during a meeting of the other six members who
would be statutorily required to elect a seventh member.3 5 The ad-
vantage of this procedure is that the seventh member would be seen
by the public, and the other committee members, as a neutral party
who would decide each case on its merits.3 A majority vote of the
committee, as in tripartite arbitration boards, would decide each
case.237
The powers of a prosecutor would remain basically intact. Prosecu-
tors' broad responsibilities include: (1) investigating crimes; (2) inter-
acting with victims and prospective witnesses; (3) deciding which
crimes to charge; (4) controlling all aspects of the grand jury process;
(5) appearing in court for all preliminary hearings; (6) offering and
accepting any plea bargains; (7) handling all aspects of the trial includ-
ing juror selection, presentation of the opening and closing state-
ments, and examining all witnesses; and (8) offering a sentence
recommendation. 38 These committees would thus assume a small
part of the prosecutors' responsibility. Prosecutors would still decide
whether to charge a defendant with first degree murder, but if they
did, the decision whether to seek the death penalty would then be
made by this committee.3 9 Every other prosecutorial function would
remain with prosecutors. These committees, therefore, would only
marginally infringe on the prosecutors' role in the criminal justice
system.
The criminal process would also be altered only slightly. Prosecu-
tors would investigate a crime, arrest a defendant, and select which
crimes to charge. If the defendant became statutorily eligible for the
death penalty, the committee would be alerted. The government and
the defense, however, would continue to perform their own investiga-
tions. After a statutorily determined amount of time,240 each party
would present the results of their investigation to the committee. The
committee would listen to the arguments, review the evidence, request
additional information if desired, and render a decision. After making
235. The legislature or the committee members themselves could request an
outside party to provide a list of individuals interested and qualified to serve on the
committee.
236. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 234, at 129-30 (referring to the neutral party
as "impartial").
237. Id at 130.
238. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense
Function 47-116 (3d ed. 1993).
239. It is possible that a rogue prosecutor, to avoid ever trying a death penalty case,
might never indict a defendant under a state's first degree murder statue. He would,
therefore, never be bound by the committee's decision. Despite the unlikeliness of
such a bold maneuver, problems such as these will be left for the individual state
legislatures to resolve.
240. For example, New York prosecutors are given 120 days to decide whether to
seek the death penalty. See supra note 66.
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a decision, the committee would release a memorandum explaining
the rationale behind its decision, but each member's vote would re-
main anonymous. The district attorney's office would then prosecute
each case accordingly, and retain responsibility for every further dis-
cretionary decision.
1. The Constitutionality of Legislatively Created Committees
A legislatively-created committee is not a radical idea. In fact, leg-
islatures clearly have the ability to create a committee whose mem-
bers are appointed by the executive branch. This is evidenced at both
the federal and state levels.
a. Congress
In 1974, in response to the Watergate scandal, Congress created the
Federal Election Commission (the "FEC"),2 41 to exclusively oversee
the election process.242 The original legislation required Congress to
appoint the members of the FEC, but the Supreme Court struck down
this arrangement.243 Today, the FEC is comprised of the Secretary of
the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives-without
voting rights-and six members appointed by the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate.244 No more than three members
can come from the same political party.245
The creation of the FEC supports the legislative power to create a
commission responsible for executive functions.246 Although the re-
sponsibilities of the FEC would vary greatly from the death penalty
committees,247 the continued existence of the FEC supports the infer-
ence that state legislatures could create a committee within the execu-
tive branch without fear of running afoul of their state constitution.
241. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1994). For an excellent discussion regarding the legislative
history of the FEC, see Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality
of Independent Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The
Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 Yale J. On Reg. 363, 370-77 (1987).
242. See Steele & Bowman, supra note 241, at 375-77.
243. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976) (holding that under Appoint-
ments Clause, Congress cannot appoint members to the FEC because the FEC has
responsibility for law enforcement and this power is delegated to the Executive
Branch by the Constitution).
244. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1).
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 376 N.E.2d 810, 825-26 (Mass.
1978) (holding that legislature may authorize a member of the executive branch, be-
sides the governor, to appoint members of a commission).
247. The FEC, unlike these committees, has the power to compel testimony, pay
witnesses, and to initiate civil actions. 2 U.S.C. § 437d (a)(4)-(6).
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b. State Legislatures
Similar to Congress' creation of the FEC, some state legislatures
have created agencies within the executive branch.' s In Colorado,
the state legislature created the Colorado Civil Rights Commission."'
The commission's powers are "[t]o receive, investigate, and pass upon
charges alleging unfair or discriminatory practices ... [and] to hold
hearings upon any complaint issued." 0 The commission consists of
seven members appointed by the governor. 151 The members of the
commission include, at all times, representatives of small businesses,
state or local governmental entities, and the community at-large.3 -s
At least four members of the commission must also represent minor-
ity communities."3
The proposed death penalty committees share characteristics with
Colorado's civil rights commission. Each is empowered to make a
critical decision involving personal issues for the defendant. Addi-
tionally, both types of cases are generally high profile and involve dis-
reputable acts allegedly committed by those accused. These
similarities serve to bolster the view that if a state legislature involves
itself in civil rights, it should also become involved in capital punish-
ment. If the state legislature, therefore, can assign the broad responsi-
bility to hear cases for an entire section of the criminal code to a
commission, it should have the power to delegate to committees the
sole discretionary decision of whether to seek the death penalty from
prosecutors to committees.
2. How Death Penalty Committees Would Be Dissimilar to
Independent Prosecutors
These proposed death penalty committees, however, are not analo-
gous to independent prosecutors. The office of the independent pros-
ecutor, at the federal level, was created by the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978.1 The United States Attorney General may appoint in-
dependent prosecutors where there is "reasonable grounds to believe
248. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1481 (1992) (describing enforcement proce-
dures for employment discrimination); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.04 (Anderson
1995) (granting Ohio Civil Rights Commission power to receive, investigate, and pass
upon written charges subject to judicial review).
249. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-303 (1988 & Supp. 1996).
250. Id §§ 24-34-305(1)(b), (d)(I). The commission is responsible for cases involv-
ing "unfair or discriminatory practices." Id § 24-34-305(l)(b). These practices in-
clude: (1) discriminatory acts by entities such as employers, employment agencies,
and labor unions; (2) unfair housing practices; (3) discrimination in public accommo-
dation; and (4) discriminatory advertising. Id. §§ 24-34402, -502, -601, -701.
251. Id § 24-34-303.
252. Id
253. Id
254. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
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that further investigation is warranted. '255 These prosecutors are del-
egated the responsibility to investigate and prosecute high ranking of-
ficials.256 The committees proposed in this Note would have the
limited power to make one discretionary decision: does this particular
crime (or crimes) warrant a capital charge? The district attorney
would retain all other prosecutorial functions, including any discre-
tionary decisions.257
This distinction is important because courts in at least two states,
Maryland and Rhode Island, have found legislative attempts to create
independent prosecutors unconstitutional. In Murphy v. Yates,25 8 the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the State Prosecutor Act,259
which created the office of the State Prosecutor and granted it the
power to investigate specific criminal acts,26° violated Maryland's
Constitution.26'
The court invalidated the act because the legislature, in creating the
office of the State Prosecutor, impermissibly intruded on the state at-
torney's discretionary powers.262 The rule, according to the court, is
"[ilf an office is created by the Constitution, and specific powers are
granted or duties imposed by the Constitution, . . . the position can
neither be abolished by statute nor reduced to impotence by the trans-
fer of duties ... to another office created by the legislature. 2 6 3  The
Maryland legislature, therefore, in attempting to create an office with
prosecutorial duties had encroached on the state attorney's constitu-
tional right to investigate and initiate criminal prosecutions.26 In re-
sponse to Murphy, the Maryland General Assembly proposed and
ratified a constitutional amendment which prescribed the powers and
duties of the State Prosecutor by the General Assembly.26 The State
Prosecutor's powers no longer came from the constitution, so there-
fore, the Murphy court's objections were mooted.266 In an opinion
which mirrors Murphy, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in re-
sponse to a request by the House of Representatives, answered that
255. Id § 592(b)(1). The Supreme Court held that the independent counsel statute
was constitutional. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988).
256. See Conference, Federal Election Commission Panel Discussion: Problems and
Possibilities, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 223, 234-35 (1994).
257. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
258. 348 A.2d 837 (Md. 1975).
259. Md. Code Ann., art. 10, § 33A-F (1996).
260. Id § 33B(b). A special prosecutors could act on his own or upon the request
of certain executive officials or the General Assembly. Id.
261. Murphy, 348 A.2d at 848.
262. Id
263. Id at 846 (citations omitted).
264. Id at 848.
265. See Survey of Maryland Court of Appeals Decisions 1975-1976, 37 Md. L. Rev.
61, 95-96 (1977).
266. This change has proven successful as the statute creating the Office of the
State Prosecutor is still valid. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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proposed legislation to create procedures to appoint special prosecu-
tors would violate the duties and powers of the attorney general.267
States can therefore respond to constitutional challenges to these
committees in two different ways: (1) they can claim that simply re-
moving the discretionary decision whether to seek the death penalty
fails to render prosecutors impotent because prosecutors retain the
power to make every other decision in capital cases; or (2) they can
amend their constitution to create these committees. Either alterna-
tive provides an acceptable avenue for states to deal with constitu-
tional challenges which have proven successful with respect to
independent prosecutors.
Unlike the creation of independent prosecutors, prosecutors might
not challenge, but rather support, these committees. Some district at-
torneys have, in fact, created their own informal death penalty com-
mittees. In New York City, the Manhattan and Brooklyn District
Attorneys have established committees to assist them in making the
decision whether to seek the death penalty.2" These committees will
analyze the available information and make a recommendation to the
district attorney on whether to seek the death penalty.269 These com-
mittees enable the district attorney to deflect some of the pressure
Governor Pataki put upon District Attorney Johnson.27 0 Although a
district attorney's creation of informal committees lends credence to
this proposal, concrete reasons exist to justify why these death penalty
committees would improve the present structure.
B. Advantages of a Death Penalty Committee
The entire process will benefit by removing the discretionary deci-
sion to seek the death penalty from an elected official and placing it
with a committee. The committee will ensure a less political decision,
increase the legitimacy of the system, increase the public accountabil-
267. See In re House of Representatives (Special Prosecutor), 575 A.2d 176, 179-80
(R.I. 1990).
268. See Jan Hoffman, Lawyers Prepare for New York's Death Penalty, N.Y. Tunes,
Aug. 31, 1995, at Al, B4 ("Robert M. Morganthau ... said... that he has set up a
committee to scrutinize first-degree murder cases .... In Broolyn.... Mr. Hynes has
set up a screening panel that he says will evaluate... potential death penalty cases.").
269. See id These committees differ significantly from the death penalty commit-
tees proposed in this Note. In contrast to the committees district attorneys have cre-
ated, the death penalty committees would be statutorily based providing them with a
more assured existence. Additionally, the decision of the death penalty committees
would be binding on the prosecutor. Finally, the members of the death penalty com-
mittees would be appointed by both the governor and the district attorney rather then
solely by the district attorney.
270. Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes is the only district attorney in New
York City to announce an intention to seek the death penalty. See Joseph F. Fried,
Brooklyn Case Is City's First Seeking Death, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1996, at Al [herein-
after Fried, First Seeking Death]; Joseph P. Fried, Brooklyn Prosecutor Seeks Death
Penalty in a 2d Case, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 12, 1996, at B4.
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ity of the decision maker, and avoid discriminatory application of the
death penalty.
1. The Committees Allow Politicians Openly to Use Death
Penalty As a Political Issue
The death penalty and politics are intertwined. 271 By allowing pros-
ecutors and the governor to appoint members of these committees,
politicians would openly espouse their views on the death penalty and
use these views as a way to distinguish themselves from their oppo-
nents without fear of later repercussions.272 Governors and prosecu-
tors would announce their views on the death penalty, and if elected,
claim a public mandate to appoint like-minded committee
members.2 73
Allowing politicians to express freely their views supports a func-
tioning representative democracy.274 If a purpose of democracy is to
ensure the representation of all, especially minorities, 275 then voters
need to know politicians' views prior to an election.276 If district at-
torneys are unable, because of a fear of supersedure, to announce
their views on the death penalty, then voters who feel strongly either
way are forced to vote blindly on this issue. These committees, by
assuming the discretionary decision whether to seek the death pen-
alty, allow prosecutors to reveal their views on the death penalty, and
thus educate the voters.
Having political officials appoint the committee members guaran-
tees that politics will continue to play a role in the decision whether to
seek the death penalty. It would, however, be one layer removed be-
cause committee members would be immune to public opinion. The
committee members would be guaranteed a position on the commit-
tee for as long as their appointer remained in office. This ensures that
no member could be removed for refusing to be a puppet for the per-
271. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
272. See Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death
Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates' Campaigning on Capital Convictions,
7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 941, 944 (1994) ("It is of course not unethical for candidates to
campaign on their support for capital punishment.").
273. See Jacoby, American Prosecutor, supra note 15, at 198 ("[I]f one knows the
policy of the prosecutor, one should expect a pattern of dispositions consistent with
that policy.").
274. See The Federalist No. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 1990) (stating that purpose of democracy is "to refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens");
John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 86-87 (1980)
(discussing need for adequate representation of minorities in a democracy).
275. See Ely, supra note 274, at 135-79 (discussing the need for protecting the vot-
ing power of minorities).
276. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 1427 ("[A] correspondence between [prosecu-
tors] preferences of [their] constituents will usually be achieved, and when it is not,
[prosecutors] will often be at pains to justify [their] divergence from the advice
proffered.").
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son who appointed him. Once either the governor or district attorney
retired or lost office, the replacement would be entitled to name new
members. 2' If, however, either government official left in the middle
of his term, the replacement would not have the power to name new
members because his appointments may not accurately reflect the
views of the electorate.
This fear of political influence and partisanship played a large role
in the creation and make-up of the FEC.278 To combat this fear, Con-
gress mandated that no more then three members of the FEC could
be members of the same political party.279 Congress thus protected
the legitimacy of the FEC against assertions of partisanship and a lack
of independence.280 These death penalty committees would likely ac-
complish the same because the interests of local communities and of
the state-wide population would be equally represented, and there-
fore, the committees' decision would reflect the views of both
populations.
2. The Committees Increase Legitimacy in the Discretionary
Decision-Making Process
Although these committees would allow the politicizing of the
death penalty, they would, at the same time, depoliticize the decision
whether to seek the death penalty."8 Although the Supreme Court
has found prosecutorial discretion in this context to be constitu-
tional,' the policy concerns of holding a single individual responsible
for such a monumental decision are too great to ignore. Unbridled
prosecutorial discretion exposes the decision to personal and political
issues.28 Prosecutors can be influenced by issues from their past,'
277. Vacancies in both the FEC and the Colorado Civil Rights Commission are
filled by the head of the executive branch-the same manner that the original mem-
bers were chosen. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)(D) (1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-
303 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996). The key difference is that although these committees
are appointed by a single person in the executive branch, death penalty committees
will be appointed by both the governor and local prosecutors.
278. See Steele & Bowman, supra note 241, at 375-76.
279. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1).
280. See Steele & Bowman, supra note 241, at 375-76.
281. People generally place greater trust in a group decision. Our jury system and
our appellate system are both based on the theory that convincing a majority of peo-
ple, rather then a single individual, carries stronger weight. The same logic would
follow here. People would inherently trust a decision made by seven people in public,
rather than a decision made by one person in private.
282. See supra part II.A.
283. See Jacoby, Charging Policies, supra note 21, at 76-77.
284. Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes, whose mother was abused by his
father, is known to be especially sensitive to this issue. See Robert Neuwirth, Reversal
of Fortune, Brooklyn Bridge, Aug. 1996, at 37, 38 ("The first recollection was hearing
my mother scream from her bedroom and seeing her bloody face and my father
standing by her reeking of alcohol. I was five years old."). It would not be a stretch
to argue that he would tend to show leniency toward defendants who share a similar
past.
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their relationship with the defendant's attorney, political factors in-
cluding a need to be tough on crime, or personal revenge (e.g., the
victim is a police officer, from the district attorney's office, a family
member, or a friend). Removing the decision from local prosecutors
alerts the public that an individual's personal agenda will not be the
decisive factor. The public also will be assured that the decision was
made based on factors other than politics. 285 Even if one person votes
for an application of the death penalty because of a personal agenda,
at least three other people have to be convinced on the merits. One
member's personal bias will unlikely affect any given case.
The presence of the seventh member also will serve to increase the
legitimacy of these committees.286 The seventh member will be seen
by the public as immune from the pressures of public opinion as his
appointment was a result of negotiation between the appointees, not a
response to a political mandate. It may often be the case that local
prosecutors and the governor have diametrically opposed views on the
death penalty.287 The seventh member, chosen by the other six mem-
bers, necessarily will represent the moderate view because the three
members from each side will have to reach a compromise and select
the seventh member. Thus, even if the governor and the district attor-
ney are on the extremes of the death penalty debate, the presence of
the seventh member assures a thoughtful and even-handed decision.
3. The Committees Increase Accountability of the
Decision Maker
Committees would reduce the secrecy and thereby increase the ac-
countability surrounding their decisions by publishing the reasons for
their decisions. A district attorney must make discretionary decisions
on a daily basis, and to require him to publish the rationale behind his
decision in this one category of cases would create an increased bur-
den on an already strained budget. It might also raise the possibility
285. See Hancock et al., supra note 50, at 1564-65.
286. The FEC, with only six members, has received criticism. See Conference, supra
note 256, at 223-26.
287. The distance between the views on capital punishment of Pataki and Johnson
will not likely be as extreme in other jurisdictions. More likely, the party who op-
poses the death penalty will recognize that the legislature passed it into law, and
although opposing the law in general, will recognize that rigid opposition results in an
effective nullification of the law. Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes, although
publicly opposed to the death penalty, has already announced his intention to seek it
and is going to try the first case himself. See Fried, First Seeking Death, supra note
270, at Al; Neuwirth, supra note 284, at 38 ("Hynes's moral position is well known:
he is against capital punishment.... He doesn't think it is fair. But now that it is the
law in New York State, Hynes is practically licking his chops at the prospect of bring-
ing a capital case to court in Brooklyn."). Nevertheless, even if a scenario similar to
the Pataki-Johnson dispute is unlikely, these committees remain necessary to resolve
the dangers of having one person decide whether to seek the death penalty. See supra
part II.B.
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that people would extrapolate his logic into other more simple crimi-
nal decisions. These committees, however, would deal solely with cap-
ital cases, so their rationales would ideally be consistent.
Additionally, publishing these decisions would establish an informal
set of precedent that future committee members could look to for gui-
dance.' As the number of decisions reached by the committee in-
creased, they would be able to use prior cases as benchmarks to guide
their own conclusions.' This would ensure consistency in two fact
similar cases.2" At the least, this would ensure some measure of con-
sistency within each county.
4. The Committees Decrease the Possibility of Discriminatory
Application of Death Sentences
Finally, greater accountability will improve the chances of prevent-
ing discriminatory application of capital sentences.291 Both the gover-
nor and district attorney will hopefully appoint members who
adequately reflect the diversity of a county's population.29 Pressure
would be on both the governor and the district attorney to ensure
minority representation because both are elected officials and need
the support of the people of the county for reelection. In this way,
those claiming that capital punishment is sought disproportionately
against minorities will have to counter the fact of minority representa-
tion on the committee. Furthermore, neither official would want to be
labeled as the person who entrenched continued discriminatory appli-
cation of the death penalty.
State legislatures should act to create committees empowered to
make the decision whether to seek the death penalty. These commit-
tees would resolve the issues present when prosecutors individually
make these decisions without infringing greatly on prosecutors' discre-
tionary power.
288. See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 1565-66 (calling for prosecutors to pub-
lish a record of the factual bases and reasons of their significant decisions).
289. See Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law of Sentencing: Develop-
ing Judicial Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 Fordhan L. Rev. 927, 940 (1996) (advocating
requirement that judges provide written statements regarding factual information of
the case to assist judges in later cases).
290. Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 1566. The downside of having committees pub-
lish their decisions is that it might be seen as eliminating the discretion these commit-
tees are designed to protect. Committees might feel bound to follow prior
committee's decisions, thus restricting their ability to decide each case on its individ-
ual facts. This risk, however, is outweighed by the need to inform the public how and
why committees are making these discretionary decisions. Voters could then use this
knowledge when evaluating the politicians who appointed committee members.
291. See Bright, supra note 33, at 450-54 (highlighting that in Georgia's Chattahoo-
chee Judicial Circuit from 1973 to 1990, African-Americans were victims of sixty-five
percent of the homicides, yet these cases made up only fifteen percent of capital cases
in the circuit).
292. Id. at 451-54 (stating that white prosecutors may believe certain murders to be
more heinous if victims are white and often only meet with white victims' families).
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CONCLUSION
The dangers of placing the discretionary decision of whether to seek
the death penalty with prosecutors existed long before Governor
Pataki superseded District Attorney Johnson. By focusing attention
on the potential abuse of this discretion, this controversy provided the
impetus for change. The only way to avoid a situation similar to New
York's is to transfer this discretionary decision to committees. Com-
mittees will allow prosecutors, attorneys general, and governors to
freely express their views on the death penalty without compromising
the need for consistency and legitimacy in the decision making pro-
cess. Given the seriousness of the death penalty, state legislatures
with a death penalty statute should amend their statute and create a
committee in every county empowered to decide whether to seek the
death penalty against a particular defendant.
